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RATLIFF V. ASTRUE: THE COLLISION OF THE EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AND THE DEBT COLLECTION
IMPROVEMENT ACT
Joseph A. Fischetti
I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),
a partial waiver of sovereign immunity permitting “prevailing parties”
in cases against the federal government to recover attorney’s fees and
1
costs. The original EAJA contained a sunset provision and expired
2
in 1984 but was promptly reenacted and has since remained in place.
Historically, attorney’s fee payments under the EAJA were directed to
the attorney of the prevailing party or to the attorney and her client
3
jointly. This system allowed for the attorney to collect her fees
promptly without going through her client as an intermediary.
In a series of recent cases, most frequently involving successful
appeals of administrative denials of Social Security disability benefits,
the government has argued that the literal language of the EAJA does
not allow for direct payment to attorneys but instead directs fees ex4
clusively to the clients themselves. At first glance, this distinction
might appear minor and technical as well as perhaps inefficient or
inconvenient, but not devastating in its repercussions. This new system, however, poses two significant problems that effectively undermine the fee-shifting goals of the EAJA. First, it forces the client to
serve as an extra channel through whom the funds must travel before
∗
J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, The
George Washington University. Sincere thanks to Professor Thomas Healy for his
supervision and advice, and to Brian De Vito, Keerthi Mundrati, and Steven Zaorski
for their comments and assistance.
1
Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2321, 2327–29.
2
Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006).
3
See Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2009); Respondent’s Brief in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S.
June 25, 2009).
4
See, e.g., Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48
(2009); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486
(2008).
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reaching their ultimate destination. Given that fees permissible un5
der the EAJA are quite meager and that clients who avail themselves
of the fees often face financial hardship, the possibility of nonpayment or partial payment is substantial. Second, and more importantly, direct payment to the client qualifies the payments for automatic
6
offset pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996.
Therefore, a client can win his suit and receive an award of attorney’s
fees but lack the opportunity to furnish those fees to his attorney because of the automatic offset of the fees against the client’s other out7
standing debts to the government. These offsets have spawned recent litigation to determine the proper payable party because fee
payments are not subject to offsets when they are in the name of the
attorney rather than the debtor-client. If continued, the offsets could
have the long-term effect of creating a disincentive for attorneys to
enter practice areas that are reliant on government-paid attorney’s
8
fees, especially for clients with other outstanding debts. As a result,
direct payment of attorney’s fees to indebted clients essentially defeats the purpose of the EAJA by removing the attorney’s assurance
that she will receive those fees if she prevails in her case.
Circuits are split on whether fees should be paid to the client or
his counsel. Most courts side with the government’s interpretation of
the statute and order payment of the funds to the “prevailing party”
9
rather than counsel. But a sizable minority of courts have instead
10
sided with the claimants and ordered payment of the fees directly to
11
their attorneys. When courts pay EAJA fees directly to the attorneys,
5

The statutory cap on EAJA fee payments is $125 per hour, with adjustments for
cost of living expenses. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).
6
31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006); see infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
7
To be offset under the Debt Collection Improvement Act, the debt must be to
a government agency. § 3716(a). The offsets are not available to assist in recovery
for private creditors.
8
See Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 139 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) (“At oral argument, counsel for Stephens, who represented all thirty-four of the claimants in this
case, stated that he already had declined representation for several Social Security
claimants who would have been subject to an administrative offset.”).
9
See, e.g., Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2009); Stephens, 565 F.3d at 140; Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 2008); Manning
v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008).
10
For reasons discussed infra note 63, litigation on this matter most frequently
features the client seeking direct payment to his attorney while the government seeks
to pay directly to the client. The client’s best interests are typically served by keeping
the fees in his attorney’s name so as to avoid potential government offsets.
11
See, e.g., Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 48 (2009); see also King v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 230 F. App’x 476, 481 (6th Cir.

FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

5/20/2010 4:59 PM

COMMENT

725

they generally do so for policy reasons and for the sake of consisten12
cy, as most courts, until recently, always paid attorneys directly.
If the disputes on this question were confined to Social Security
disability appeals, where most of the litigation in this area has so far
taken place, the impact of these decisions would be limited to that rather narrow and esoteric field. But the EAJA can be implicated in
13
nearly all civil suits against the federal government. The broader effect of interpreting the EAJA to direct funds to the client may be to
dissuade attorneys from entering any practice area with a substantial
number of cases in which a federal government agency, department,
or official will be a party. Beyond the EAJA, applying a literal reading
of the “prevailing party” language presents a broader problem. This
language, awarding the fees to “prevailing parties,” is not isolated to
the EAJA; rather, it is boilerplate fee-shifting language for federal statutes that permit recovery of attorney’s fees in countless areas, including civil rights statutes, environmental laws, and consumer protection
14
actions.
If courts in EAJA cases continue to direct payments to
clients rather than counsel, a genuine and substantial risk exists that
the resulting precedent could apply to civil-rights statutes and any
other statute containing the same “prevailing party” fee-shifting language. Under current Supreme Court precedent, the term “prevail15
ing party” applies identically across federal statutes. Therefore, a
holding with regard to the proper payable party in a case involving
the EAJA will be applicable to all other similar fee-shifting statutes
employing that language. In that event, the effect of permitting offsets from attorney’s fee statutes would be to dissuade attorneys from
entering numerous practice areas that are reliant on such statutes.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the legislative history of the
EAJA and compare Supreme Court rulings on the “prevailing party”
language. Part III of this Comment will summarize the competing
views of the circuit courts that have disagreed on the question of who
2007) (unpublished decision), overruled by Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d
443, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2009).
12
See, e.g., Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 802; King, 230 F. App’x at 481.
13
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2006) (“[A] court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys . . . to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against
the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action.”) (emphasis added).
14
See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
15
E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983);
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980).
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is the proper recipient of attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to the
EAJA. Part IV of this Comment explains why the client is currently
the proper payable party in the absence of an assignment of fees to
his attorney, discusses the potential impact that these EAJA-related
rulings could have on civil-rights statutes, and evaluates potential
judicial and legislative options for improvement of the law in this
area. Ultimately, this Comment will argue that the EAJA directs payments to the client, not his attorney, but that this process can be circumvented through the use of assignments. Nevertheless, to fix this
problem fully, Congress will need to initiate legislative reforms.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND “PREVAILING PARTY” INTERPRETATION
Congress enacted the original EAJA in 1980 as a component of a
16
bill providing assistance for small business. The originally enacted
legislation contained a sunset provision that caused the law to expire
17
in 1984. The EAJA was renewed on a permanent basis in 1985, and
the new version contained a retroactivity provision to fill the gap
18
from the time of the original EAJA’s expiration. The new version
contained some minor technical amendments, but the core of the law
19
remained intact. Congress included additional amendments as part
20
of a 1996 reform package; it proposed more amendments recently,
21
but none has passed or even gained traction.
A. Legislative History
Most of the EAJA’s official legislative history comes from the
House Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied passage of the

16

Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321.
Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 222
(1994).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
For information about the 1996 amendments, which are mostly outside the
scope of this Comment, see Judith E. Kramer, Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments of
1996: A New Avenue for Recovering Fees from the Government, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1999). The changes allow parties to recover fees in situations where the government prevails but its original demand is “substantially in excess of the final award”
and also increase the inflation-adjusted hourly rate cap from $75 to $125. Id. at 376–
77.
21
H.R. 1735, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 5833, 110th Cong. (2008); Albert B.
Crenshaw, GAO Finds Little Help to Understand Rules; Agencies Flout the Law, Report Says,
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at E8.
17

FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

5/20/2010 4:59 PM

COMMENT

727

22

1980 legislation.
The report reveals that the legislation was designed to benefit “certain individuals, partnerships, corporations and
labor and other organizations” by ensuring that they are not “deterred from seeking review of, or defending against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the
23
vindication of their rights.” Through a requirement that funds be
paid directly from agency coffers, the EAJA’s design serves a two-fold
purpose: to make it easier for individuals and small businesses to seek
remedies against the federal government and to deter government
24
agencies from abusing their power.
The legislation accomplished its goal through a limited statutory
exception to the “American Rule” on attorney’s fee payments and
through a waiver of sovereign immunity. The longstanding practice
in American jurisprudence is for each party to a civil lawsuit to bear
25
the burden of its own costs. Under the English Rule, by contrast,
the losing party is responsible for paying the fees of the winning par26
The policy incentives behind either rule will inevitably clash
ty.
when adversaries have disproportionate wealth and resources. For
example, under the American Rule, a poor client will be left responsible for his own fees despite prevailing against a major corporation,
whereas under the English Rule, a prevailing corporation can impose

22

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984. Although the EAJA was originally proposed in the Senate, the Senate Small Business
Committee’s Report simply adopted the House Report and did not issue any independent findings of significance. S. REP. NO. 96-974 passim (1980), as reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953. Similarly, the Conference Report on the EAJA essentially
summarizes the statutory text, providing little in the way of interpretation or explanation. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1434, at 20–28 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5010–17.
23
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 5, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4984.
24
See id. at 9–10; see also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 890 (1989) (interpreting the EAJA “in light of its purpose to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, government action”) (internal citations omitted).
25
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–54, 269
(1975) (explaining the history of and reaffirming the American Rule by precluding
fee-shifting without an existing authorization under statute or common law); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (overturning the inclusion of attorney’s fees, recognizing the prevailing practice among the states, and establishing the
American Rule).
26
John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1601–13 (1993) (discussing the current United Kingdom law as part of a broader comparative discussion of fee-shifting rules in
different jurisdictions).
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27

its substantial fee costs upon a near-insolvent losing plaintiff. In this
sense, the advantages and disadvantages of each rule can vary based
on the outcome of the case. In different circumstances, each rule
can appear just or unjust based on whether the wealthier party pre28
vails. The American Rule is not ironclad, and it has some exceptions in both common law and statutory law, but it is the general rule
29
for lawsuits in the United States.
In its entirety, the EAJA contains three separate fee-shifting pro30
visions. The first provision is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
that opens the federal government to the same common-law excep31
The
tions to the American Rule as a private party would face.
second provision extends the waiver to instances where the court
32
finds the government’s position to be unreasonable. The third provision creates a process for recovering costs when a party prevails in
33
an administrative adjudication.
The legislation operates in a straightforward and direct manner
but contains a significant amount of language that has been disputed
and can be subject to multiple interpretations. The statute awards
both “a judgment for costs” and “reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys . . . to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or any official of the United
34
States acting in his or her official capacity.” Within thirty days of a
final judgment, the party seeking an award of fees must submit an
application to the court, including “an itemized statement from any
attorney or expert witness representing or appearing on behalf of the
35
party.” If the court then determines that the party prevailed in the
suit, the party will be entitled to compensation for costs, including at27

For real-life examples of such dilemmas, see Tim Cornwell, “Double or Quits:”
Quayle Likes the “English Rule” but Brits Have Their Doubts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992,
at 1, available at 1992 WLNR 5213065. Insurance will often cover the costs of the losing party in English Rule jurisdictions. Dan Slater, The Debate over Who Pays Fees When
Litigants Mount Attacks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2008, at A8.
28
Note that the EAJA works only to the advantage of the individual or small
business: the government may be forced to pay the plaintiff’s costs, but the plaintiff is
never under any obligation to pay the costs of the government. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b)
(2006).
29
See Vargo, supra note 26, at 1578–90.
30
See Sisk, supra note 17, at 223–25.
31
Id. at 223.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 224.
34
28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (b) (2006).
35
§ 2412(d)(1)(B).
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36

torney’s fees. There are, however, three significant limitations on
the right of a prevailing party to receive fees. First, awarded fees can37
not exceed $125 per hour, subject to cost of living adjustments.
Second, when a client is an individual with a net worth over $2 million or a business or business owner with a net worth over $7 million,
38
the client is not eligible for fee payments. Third, if “the court finds
that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that
special circumstances make an award unjust,” then the court will not
39
grant an award.
The statute directs the fees and costs to the “prevailing party,” a
40
term mirrored in many other federal statutes.
When Congress
enacted the EAJA, it was cognizant of the existence of statutes using
identical language in other contexts, including civil-rights and envi41
ronmental statutes. Despite the seemingly clear meaning of this
language, the term “prevailing party” has been the subject of signifi42
cant litigation. Congress did not use the EAJA committee report as
a venue to provide additional guidance on interpreting the term, but
instead stated only that “[i]t is the committee’s intention that the interpretation of the term [‘prevailing party’] be consistent with the
43
law that has developed under existing statutes.”
B. Judicial Interpretation of “Prevailing Party” Language
Congress made clear its intention that existing precedent on the
44
term “prevailing party” should control interpretation of the EAJA.
When Congress passed the EAJA, the direct recipient of the funds was

36

§ 2412(d)(1)(A).
§ 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).
38
§ 2412(d)(2)(B).
39
§ 2412(d)(1)(A).
40
§ 2412(b), (d)(1)(A).
41
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 8 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4987. Specifically, the committee report pointed to Titles II and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title III of the Organized Crime Control Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Voting Rights Act of
1975, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award
Act of 1976. Id. But the list from the committee report is not exhaustive. Other examples of the same “prevailing party” language can be found in statutes such as the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)
(2006), and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B), (3)(B), (4) (2006).
42
See infra Part II.B.
43
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990.
44
Id.
37

FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2010 4:59 PM

730

[Vol. 40:723

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
45

an uncontroversial matter. The drafters probably never contemplated the possibility of such a dispute. The legislative history contains an in-depth discussion of what precisely, under existing
precedent, makes a party qualify as “prevailing” in light of the possibilities of reversed appellate victories, partial victories, and partial re46
versals. By the time Congress drafted the EAJA, significant litigation
had already taken place over the term’s definition, but none of it fo47
cused on the determination of the payable party. Since the passage
of the EAJA, a great deal of litigation has ensued over the “prevailing
party” language and the interplay between an attorney and her client
on the issue of fee payments. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
48
yet to directly address the question of who is the proper payee, but it
49
has provided some guidance for how to interpret the phrase. Most
importantly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that all statutes
that include the phrase “prevailing party” with regard to attorney’s
50
fees should receive identical interpretive treatment.
When the Court has discussed issues of fees for prevailing parties, it has frequently referred to the fees as belonging not just to the
51
“prevailing party” but also to the “claimant” and “plaintiff.” Although these dicta are not dispositive, they demonstrate that the
Court, like Congress, views the payable party as the client, claimant,
or plaintiff, and not the attorney representing him. In other in45

Contemporaneous cases interpreting language of the EAJA and other “prevailing party” fee-shifting statutes do not directly discuss the dilemma of determining a
proper recipient, and dicta in those cases suggest that courts were not even contemplating the question. See infra notes 51–65 and accompanying text.
46
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11–12, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990–91.
47
Sisk, supra note 17, at 227 (“Precisely because of the significant policy and financial issues lurking behind every EAJA dispute, this statute has been the situs of
closely fought litigation battles. . . . [V]irtually every paragraph and phrase in the statute has been the subject of litigation and nearly every word has been parsed by the
courts in reported decisions.”).
48
See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text.
49
Id.
50
E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983);
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980). The legislative history also reflects this understanding. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
51
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (“Under EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a successful Social Security benefits
claimant, may be awarded fees . . . .”); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (“A plaintiff must be a
‘prevailing party’ to recover an attorney’s fee under § 1988.”); see also id. at 441
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I also agree that plaintiffs may receive attorney’s fees for
cases in which ‘they succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefits sought in bringing suit.’”).
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stances, when the Court specifically addressed whether a party has actually prevailed, it has also used the individual client as the stand-in
who must achieve actual success to “prevail” in the suit. For example,
the Court held in Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources that a plaintiff is not entitled to
fees when his lawsuit is rendered moot because the defendant
52
stopped engaging in the offensive behavior as a result of the suit. In
so holding, the Court made clear that its determination was based on
the perspective of the client and not the attorney, stating that under
its prior cases, “a ‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded
53
some relief.” Relief is awarded for the benefit of the client, not his
attorney. Additionally, the Court, viewing the term “prevailing party”
as a legal term of art, cited Black’s Law Dictionary to define a prevailing party as a “party in whose favor judgment is rendered, regardless
54
of the amount of damages awarded.” Also instructive in this particular instance is Justice Scalia’s concurrence, where he wrote, “[W]hen
‘prevailing party’ is used by courts or legislatures in the context of a
lawsuit, it is a term of art. It has traditionally—and to my knowledge,
prior to the enactment of the first statutes at issue here, invariably—
55
meant the party that wins the suit . . . .” The Court’s treatment of
the term “prevailing party” in Buckhannon largely reinforces the idea
that the term refers strictly to the individual seeking relief and not his
counsel. But because the nature of the dispute in Buckhannon is so
easily distinguished from the current situation, the Court’s dicta
there are hardly definitive here.
The Court has touched on the question of the payable party
more closely in cases involving disputes between the attorney and the
56
client. In Venegas v. Mitchell, an attorney sought to attain fees pursuant both to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and a contingency agreement with his
client. In reaching its decision, the Court held that “section 1988
makes the prevailing party eligible for a discretionary award of attorney’s fees” because “it is the party, rather than the lawyer, who is so

52

532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001).
Id. at 603.
54
Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)); see also id. at 628–29
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for using the Black’s definition and
arguing that “[i]n prior cases, [the Court has] not treated Black’s Law Dictionary as
preclusively definitive”). The definition of “prevailing party” remains identical in the
latest edition. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (9th ed. 2009).
55
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56
495 U.S. 82 (1990).
53
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eligible.” But dispositive as the language might seem as it relates to
the payable party, the case primarily focused on the question of con58
tingent fees exceeding statutory awards.
To the extent that the
holding discussed the eligible party, it applied only to disputes over
contingent fees and predefined contractual arrangements between a
59
plaintiff and his attorney. The language indicating that the party
should receive the fees in that circumstance does not automatically
lead to the conclusion that the party should receive the fees directly
in the current circumstance, when both the attorney and the client
want payment directed to the attorney alone.
The Court provided its most insightful precedent on the question of the proper payable party in Evans v. Jeff D., where it held that a
plaintiff has the authority to waive § 1988 attorney’s fees as part of a
60
settlement agreement. In that case, the Court made the client the
master of the attorney’s fees and held that “Congress bestowed upon
the ‘prevailing party’ (generally plaintiffs) a statutory eligibility for a
discretionary award of attorney’s fees in specified civil rights actions.
It did not prevent the party from waiving this eligibility anymore than
61
it legislated against assignment of this right to an attorney.” This
holding makes clear that the right to fees belongs to the client and
that the attorney is powerless to prevent the client from bargaining
away attorney’s fee payments during the course of settlement negotia62
tions. The decision sidesteps the question of who could be an eligible recipient of the fees. In fact, it explicitly states that the client re63
tains the right to assign attorney’s fees to his counsel.
The existing precedent makes clear that the client is the ultimate decision maker regarding fees between client and attorney.
57

Id. at 87–88.
Id.
59
See id. at 89.
60
475 U.S. 717, 720 (1986).
61
Id. at 730−31.
62
See Martha Sherrill Davis, Attorney Fee Awards in Voting Rights Litigation, 34 S.D.
L. REV. 303, 332–36 (1989); David Paul Enzminger, Note, Waive Goodbye to Law in the
Public Interest—The Use of Coercive Fee Waivers in Civil Rights Actions, Evans v. Jeff. D.,
475 U.S. 717 (1986), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749, 757−59 (1987).
63
Under the current practice of the Social Security Administration, as seen in
Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008),
discussed infra Part III.A, the government will write a check to the client, care of the
attorney. The client can direct the funds as he chooses, and he may be under a contractual obligation to assign them to his attorney. But the client’s ability to assign the
right does not speak to the willingness of the government or the court to enter the
attorney as the direct recipient without using the client as an intermediary.
58
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The recent line of cases, however, raises the question as to whether
the statutory language precludes the client from requesting that the
funds be payable directly to his attorney. Noteworthy in the Supreme
Court cases is the absence of consideration given to the identification
of the proper recipient. With the concern focusing on whether the
client or the attorney is better suited to make decisions, the Court repeatedly determined that the client was the appropriate decision
maker. But the Court never addressed the question of what might
happen if the plaintiff and the defendant disagreed. In the past, parties have litigated the amount of the fees owed or whether fees were
owed at all, but because the burden of writing a check to an attorney
rather than the client was so marginal, attorneys never litigated the
64
determination of the proper recipient. Instead, courts did not begin looking into the current question until losing parties started to
dispute the appropriateness of direct payment to attorneys.
III. THE EAJA PAYABLE-PARTY CIRCUIT SPLIT
From the EAJA’s enactment in 1980 through 2005, only in limited instances did parties litigate disputes over whether the proper
65
payable party should be the client or his counsel. Many, if not most,
of the recent cases presenting this question have been in the context
of successful appeals from administrative denials of Social Security
disability benefits, most likely because they are common and feature
plaintiffs with disabilities who are more likely to face financial hard66
ship resulting in debts to the government.
64

See infra Part III.
Before the Social Security Administration began requesting that EAJA fees be
paid only to the client, the question was litigated almost exclusively in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See, e.g.,
FDL Techs., Inc. v. Nathan, 967 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that “the
prevailing party, and not counsel, is entitled to attorney fees” when a military contractor prevailed in a contract dispute against the Army); Phillips v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that fee awards should be made
“to the ‘prevailing party,’ not the attorney”); see also Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d
297, 304 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that “prevailing party” language in fee-shifting provisions of federal tax statutes directs payment to the attorneys because “the prevailing
party is only nominally the person who receives the award; the real party in interest
vis-à-vis attorneys’ fees awarded under the statute are the attorneys themselves”) (citing Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979)). No other court of appeals addressed the question directly until King v. Commissioner of Social Security, 230
F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2007).
66
In 2006, the Social Security Administration received 2,140,112 applications for
disability benefits with an award rate of just 33.7 percent. OFFICE OF RES.,
EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE
65
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Some older EAJA cases raised the payable-party question but did
only indirectly. In those cases, the question involved the standing of
an attorney to independently request fees pursuant to a fee-shifting
statute with “prevailing party” language. An often-cited case in this
area is Oguachuba v. INS, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that an attorney did not have standing to petition for fees and that when fees are available, the motion must be on
67
the client’s behalf. But the resurgence of the payable-party question
reopened Oguachuba to scrutiny. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit recently held that an attorney could bring a motion
for fees on her own behalf, principally because the court concluded
68
that she was the payable party and entitled to the fees. But while the
standing question relates to the current question on the margins, it is
the subject of a separate circuit split that is outside the scope of this
69
Comment.
On the question of the proper payable party under the EAJA,
circuit courts are split. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,
Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits all take the position that
70
the fees are payable only to the client. The U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits take the opposite position that the

SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 136 (2008), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2007/di_asr07.pdf. For a description of the typical problems that face a Social Security disability claimant, see
Morton Denlow, Substantial Evidence Review in Social Security Cases as an Issue of Fact, 28
J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 29, 29–39 (2008).
67
706 F.2d 93, 97 (1982) (“The claim that a denial of attorneys’ fees penalizes
the lawyer but not the client exhibits a fundamental confusion about the nature of
that relationship both in our legal system and under the EAJA. Whether an award of
attorneys’ fees under the Act ultimately redounds to the benefit of counsel depends
upon the private contractual arrangements between the attorney and the client.”).
68
Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48
(2009).
69
See Lowrance v. Hacker, 966 F.2d 1153, 1156 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a
split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits in an action for fees under the identical
“prevailing party” language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and stating the Seventh Circuit rule
that an exception on standing for an attorney to request fees on his own behalf exists
“where the lawyer is acting in his capacity as the client’s representative” because
“whether the motion for fees is in the name of the party or his attorney truly is a
‘technicality’” that places “form over substance”).
70
See Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2009); Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009); Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 2008),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008); FDL Techs., Inc. v. Nathan, 967 F.2d 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
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71

fees are payable directly to the attorney. Although these are the only circuit courts yet to decide the issue, district courts in all twelve cir72
cuits have confronted it.
A. Payment to the Client under Manning v. Astrue
The leading case supporting the proposition that only the client
can be a recipient of “prevailing party” attorney’s fees is Manning v.
73
Astrue. There, the Tenth Circuit confronted two issues: “(1) whether attorney’s fees under the EAJA are payable to Ms. Manning or to
her attorney and (2) if the attorney’s fees are payable to Ms. Manning, whether the fees may be offset under the Debt Collection Im74
provement Act for an outstanding student loan debt . . . .” The factual background of Manning is common for these types of cases. An
administrative proceeding resulted in the denial of supplemental So75
cial Security income benefits for Manning. She appealed this denial
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and
76
prevailed. She moved for the payment of attorney’s fees under the
77
EAJA, to which the Commissioner of Social Security did not object.

71

See Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48
(2009). The Fifth Circuit has not yet answered the question with regard to the EAJA,
but it has held that the “prevailing party” language under another statute permits
payment directly to an attorney. Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297, 304 (5th Cir.
1997). When taken with Supreme Court precedent holding that fee-shifting “prevailing party” language interpretations are interchangeable between statutes, it should
follow that the Fifth Circuit allows for EAJA payments to be paid directly to an attorney. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7
(1983). The government agrees with this position and “has treated Marre as precluding (within the Fifth Circuit) use of the offset mechanism to offset debts owed by the
prevailing party against EAJA awards.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Ratliff v.
Astrue, No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 25, 2009); see also Bean v. Barnhart, 473 F. Supp. 2d
739, 743 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (in which the Social Security Administration appears to
acquiesce to the attorney as a direct recipient).
72
See, e.g., Barber v. Astrue, No. CIV-S-00-1286 WBS DAD, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65199 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2008); Woods v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV-07-76-B-W,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27999 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 2008); Chonko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
624 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D.N.J. 2008); Hogan v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 680 (W.D.N.Y.
2008). Note that the only circuit where a district court has not yet addressed the issue directly is the Fifth Circuit, which, for reasons discussed supra note 71, has likely
concluded the question based on related precedent.
73
510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008).
74
Id. at 1248.
75
Id. at 1247.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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But when Manning received the attorney’s fees, she was given
$1966.12 less than the award amount because of an administrative
78
offset from the Department of Education for past-due student loans.
This offset was nearly one-third of the total $5958.30 attorney’s fee
79
award. Manning’s counsel filed motions for the court to set aside
the offset or to direct the fees specifically to Manning’s counsel rather than to Manning herself so that the debtless counsel could re80
ceive the full amount of the awarded fees. The district court denied
81
both motions.
In deciding the proper recipient of the funds, the Tenth Circuit
engaged in a multi-step process of evaluating the plain meaning of
the statutory language, the way that courts have interpreted identical
“prevailing party” language in other federal statutes, the EAJA’s legislative history, the broader statutory framework relating to Social Security disability payments, and the standing arguments of Oguachu82
ba.
On the question of the literal statutory language, Manning
summarily concluded that the “statutory language clearly provides
that the prevailing party, who incurred the attorney’s fees, and not
83
that party’s attorney, is eligible for the attorney’s fees.” The court
also examined how other courts have interpreted the “prevailing party” language in other statutes, but its examination was fairly cursory
84
and did not add much to the analysis of the statutory language.

78

Id. at 1247–48.
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1247.
80
Id. at 1248.
81
Id.
82
See id. at 1249–55.
83
Id. at 1249–50.
84
Supreme Court precedent on this matter does not directly address the question of the payable party but often implies that the payable party is the client. See supra Part II.B. The Manning court cited many of these precedents as support for the
idea that the court should direct payment to the client rather than to counsel.
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1250–51. But it appears that the Tenth Circuit may have exaggerated the weight of the precedent’s effect on the case. For example, the court
cited Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002), as support for its assertion that
“[u]nder EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a successful Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded fees payable by the United
States if the Government’s position in the litigation was not ‘substantially justified.’”
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1249–50. But an examination of the context surrounding the
quoted portion indicates that the Court was paraphrasing rather than interpreting
the statutory language. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Although the existing
precedent does favor an approach that would award fees to the client, the Manning
court might have exaggerated the merits of direct application of this precedent.
79
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The court also evaluated the legislative history and determined
that it supported an outcome in favor of directing the fees to the
85
client. Specifically, the court examined the House Committee Report, which stated that the EAJA “rests on the premise that certain
individuals . . . may be deterred from seeking review of . . . unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing a vindication of their rights,” and concluded that “[t]his statement of purpose directly addresses the question whether the EAJA
fees are for the claimant or for the claimant’s attorney and clearly
86
states that the fees are for the claimant.”
Perhaps the most compelling portion of the court’s analysis is its
treatment of Manning’s argument that “uncodified portions of the
87
EAJA anticipate that her attorney will receive the EAJA fee award.”
In her argument, Manning pointed to a separate attorney’s fee provi88
sion contained within the Social Security appeals law itself. When a
claimant prevails in a Social Security disability appeal, “the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judg89
ment . . . .” Manning argued that this language unambiguously di90
She further suggested that an
rects the fees to the attorney.
uncodified Savings Provision of the EAJA specifically states that fees
awarded pursuant to the Social Security Act “shall not prevent an
award of fees and other expenses” under the EAJA but that if a claimant’s attorney “receives fees for the same work” under both sections, she must “refund[] to the claimant the amount of the smaller
91
fee.” Manning argued that because the statute could potentially
have required the attorney to be responsible for refunding the EAJA

85

Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251–52.
Id. at 1251 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 5–6 (1980), as reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4984).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1251–52.
89
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006). Prevailing parties often disfavor this fee provision because it only allows the court to “certify the amount of such fee for payment
to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits.” Id. Fees pursuant to the EAJA, on the other hand, represent genuine fee shifting, where the attorney receives extra payment from the government based on the
work performed rather than simple apportionment of some benefits won in the suit.
90
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251–52.
91
Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (amending Act of Oct.
21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2321, 2330).
86
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fees, Congress therefore envisioned the attorney as the proper reci92
pient. The court did not find this argument persuasive and held
that the provision served only to help avoid double compensation,
and that it “does not state that the attorney is entitled to receive the
93
full amount of the EAJA fees awarded.”
Furthermore, the court suggested that the Social Security pastdue benefits provision was evidence that Congress intended the
client, and not the attorney, to be the direct recipient under the
94
EAJA. The past-due benefits provision directs a “fee for payment to
such attorney” and thus unambiguously designates the attorney as the
95
beneficiary of the fee payment. The court viewed this language as
indicative of “Congress know[ing] what language to use to award attorney’s fees to an attorney and what language to use when it chooses
96
to award the fees to the prevailing party.”
Under the Manning
court’s view, even if the “prevailing party” language of the EAJA is derived from a boilerplate formula for fee-shifting in federal statutes,
Congress has demonstrated a capability of deviating from that formu97
la to make the distinction between party and counsel. In the case of
the EAJA and other “prevailing party” statutes, Congress chose the
term “party” rather than “attorney” to denote the recipient.
98
In its analysis, the court also looked to Oguachuba v. INS, where
the Second Circuit considered a motion that an attorney made for
99
EAJA fees on his own behalf, rather than on behalf of his client.
The Second Circuit, without reaching a decision on the issue of the
properly payable party, dismissed the claim upon a finding that coun100
sel lacked standing to pursue fees himself. The Manning court interpreted this decision as a validation of treating the client as the
proper recipient, reasoning that if the attorney had a direct claim to
101
the fees, he would have had standing to bring the motion.
The

92

Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251.
Id.
94
Id. at 1252.
95
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006).
96
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1252.
97
Id.
98
706 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1983).
99
Id. at 97–98.
100
Id. at 98.
101
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1252. Although the Second Circuit has not yet ruled on
the appropriate payable party, some district courts in the Second Circuit have treated
Oguachuba as settling the question in favor of direct client payments. See, e.g., Marti93
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court also placed particular reliance on Panola Land Buying Ass’n v.
102
Clark, where the Eleventh Circuit held that a prevailing party’s former attorney could not claim EAJA fees when the client was willing to
103
enter a settlement agreement that included a fee-waiver provision.
In closing, the court acknowledged that for most of the EAJA’s
history, the dominant practice was to pay the attorneys directly; even
the government, the court noted, seemed to change its position on
104
the proper recipient during the course of litigation. But the court
held that in light of “the statutory language, legislative history, and
case law,” it was required to direct payment to the client, even though
105
the practice “seems counter intuitive.” The court proceeded to address briefly the issue of the Debt Collection Improvement Act and
held that all judgments against the government are subject to auto106
matic debt deductions unless a specific exception in the Act applies.
Because the EAJA is not listed as such an exception, an offset of
Manning’s attorney’s fee award to pay her student-loan debts was
107
permissible.
B. Payment to the Attorney Under Ratliff v. Astrue
At this time, only one circuit favors direct payment to the attorney. In Ratliff v. Astrue, the Eighth Circuit held that EAJA attorney’s
fees should go directly to the attorney and that government offsets of
the fees against the client’s government debts are therefore imper108
In Ratliff, attorney Catherine Ratliff successfully
missible.
represented two clients who won attorney’s fees under the EAJA that
were subject to partial offsets as a result of the clients’ debts to the
109
government. Ratliff filed a suit on her own behalf against the Social
Security Administration and claimed that because she was the proper
recipient of the attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the award reduction

no v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-0941, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1446, at *7–8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan 9,
2009).
102
844 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
103
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251.
104
Id. at 1255.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1255–56.
107
Id.
108
540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009) .
109
Id.
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110

represented an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
district court dismissed her case, holding that she did not have standing to sue the government because the client is the appropriate recipient of attorney’s fees under the EAJA; therefore, the court reasoned, Ratliff had no legal entitlement to the fees that the
111
government offset and did not suffer an injury-in-fact.
The Eighth Circuit reversed in a brief opinion containing a sur112
The court held that
prising amount of equivocation on the issue.
the attorney’s fees are awarded to the attorney and not the client, but
113
it made this decision because of peculiar in-circuit precedent. Specifically, the court cited to two cases in which it held that third-party
judgment creditors cannot recover EAJA attorney’s fees and that an
Internal Revenue Code fee-shifting statute provided for government
114
payment to the attorney rather than for an offset of taxes owed.
The court reasoned that because both of these precedents favor payment of the attorney over payment of the client’s debts, “EAJA fee
awards become the property of the prevailing party’s attorney when
115
The
assessed and may not be used to offset the claimant’s debt.”
court acknowledged that it might have reached a different conclusion
if the case were one of first impression, but it indicated that it was
116
constrained by Eighth Circuit precedent.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gruender made a compelling
argument that although in-circuit precedent required payment to the
110

Ratliff v. Astrue, No. 06-5070-RHB, 2007 WL 6894710, at *1 (D.S.D. May 10,
2007), rev’d, 540 F.3d 800, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48. The Ratliff case is unique in this
respect. In most other cases, the issue arises when the attorney makes the initial motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA. Here, however, the attorney sued on her
own behalf after her clients’ awards were offset. Id. Therefore, the precise question
in Ratliff focused on the properly payable party in the context of whether the attorney had sufficient injury to file a direct claim against the government; most other
cases typically revolve around which party should be paid if the court chooses to
award fees. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 3, at 15–18 (acknowledging the unique procedural posture of Ratliff as
compared to other EAJA payable-party cases); Reply Brief for the Petitioner in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Ratliff v. Astrue, No. 08-1322 (U.S. June
25, 2009) (same). Although the procedural posture of the case is different, the legal
issues are essentially identical.
111
Ratliff, 2007 WL 6894710, at *1.
112
See Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801–02.
113
Id. at 802.
114
Id. (citing Curtis v. City of Des Moines, 995 F.2d 125, 129 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. McPeck, 910 F.2d 509, 514 (8th Cir. 1990)).
115
Id. at 802.
116
Id.
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attorney, the holding is nevertheless “inconsistent with language in
two Supreme Court opinions, the EAJA’s plain language, and the
117
holdings of most other circuit courts.” Judge Gruender argued that
both Evans v. Jeff D., with its allowance of prevailing party discretion
in handling attorney’s fees, and Venegas v. Mitchell, with its statement
that an attorney’s fee award under § 1988 belongs to the client rather
than the attorney, indicate that an outcome for direct payment to the
118
client should ensue. Judge Gruender further argued that, especially considering Congress’s explicit direction of attorney’s fees to attorneys in other statutes, the plain language of the EAJA favors pay119
ment to the party rather than to counsel. Although he concurred
in the opinion because of binding Eighth Circuit precedent, Judge
Gruender’s concurring opinion strongly suggests that he would have
favored payment to the client if the case appeared as a matter of first
120
impression.
Prior to Ratliff, the most significant opinion in support of paying
121
the attorney directly was King v. Commissioner of Social Security. King
was one of the first cases to address this issue, and although it is an
unpublished decision, it figures prominently in subsequent district
122
court opinions rendering the same outcome. In King, the plaintiff
filed an application for supplemental Social Security income, which
123
the Commissioner denied administratively. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio reversed and deemed that the
124
Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
117

Id. at 803 (Gruender, J., concurring).
Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 803 (citing Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 88 (1990);
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986)).
119
Id. at 803–04 (Gruender, J., concurring).
120
See id. at 805. On September 30, 2009, the Supreme Court granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari. 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
121
230 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2007).
122
See, e.g., Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 805 (Gruender, J., concurring); Williams v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 549 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (D.N.J. 2008); Pegg v. Astrue, No. 7:07-221KKC, 2008 WL 2038871, at *4 (E.D. Ky. May 12, 2008); see also Hogan v. Astrue, 539
F. Supp. 2d 680, 683 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (acknowledging King as the leading circuit decision to pay the attorney but declining to follow it).
123
King, 230 F. App’x at 477.
124
Id. Unlike Manning, the decision in King featured numerous ancillary issues
for the Court to consider, including whether the notice of appeal was filed in a timely manner and whether King’s attorney filed for fees on her own behalf or on behalf
of King. Id. at 478–80. The court could have rejected the claim due to a lack of
standing if the attorney was seeking fees on her own behalf, but the court determined that the attorney was acting for King when she made the motion even though
an “inartfully styled” brief made it a close call. Id. at 482.
118
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The court approached the question by first examining the Fed125
eral Circuit’s decision in Phillips v. General Service Administration,
where the question of whether EAJA fees are payable to a client or an
126
attorney first arose.
The Phillips court issued a somewhat murky
opinion, holding that an “attorney could not directly claim or be entitled to the award” but that “there must also be an express or implied agreement that the fee award will be paid over to the legal rep127
To a certain extent, the Phillips decision was a
resentative.”
compromise; the court held that the fee was payable to the client but
128
that the client must promptly surrender the fee to the attorney. In
addition to the Federal Circuit case, the Sixth Circuit examined the
prevailing circuit practice and the long-term stance of the Commis129
sioner.
In many cases, Sixth Circuit courts included language directing attorney’s fees to the prevailing party’s counsel without any
consideration of whether she was the proper recipient and without
130
objection from the Commissioner.
The court weighed the
longstanding disposition of the Commissioner, previous Sixth Circuit
treatment of the issue, and the Phillips dicta, and it concluded that
131
EAJA fees are payable to the attorney at the request of the party.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE DEFINITION, THE FULL SCOPE OF POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The disagreement between the courts is not based on competing
policy interests or different interpretations of the statutory language.
Instead, courts consistently look at the same group of factors and

125

924 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
King, 230 F. App’x at 481.
127
Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1582–83.
128
The Phillips case represents an anomaly in that it straddled the two possible
outcomes by directing the funds to the client while going out of its way to emphasize
that the fees are not the client’s to keep. Proponents of paying the attorney directly
and proponents of paying only the client have both pointed to Phillips for support.
See Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007); King, 230 F. App’x at
481. But despite the mixed message of Phillips, the Federal Circuit clarified its position in FDL Technologies, Inc. v. Nathan, 967 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where it
unambiguously held that the client is the proper recipient of EAJA fees. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman wrote that she “can not support the improvident action .
. . which assured in the circumstances that the attorney fee award, although paid by
the government, would never reach the attorney.” Id. at 1582 (Newman, J., dissenting).
129
King, 230 F. App’x at 481–82.
130
See, e.g., Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 82 F. App’x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2003).
131
King, 230 F. App’x at 482.
126
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weigh their relative importance. These factors can be summarized as
including the statutory language, the legislative history, the policy incentives, and prior prevailing court practice.
A. Different Factors Point to Different Outcomes
When courts choose to follow the statutory language, as Manning
explicitly did, the resulting interpretation invariably favors paying the
132
client rather than the attorney.
The EAJA states, “[A] court may
award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys . . . to the prevailing
133
party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”
The use of the term “prevailing party” appears to refer exclusively to
the plaintiff; the statute directs courts to award the fees to the party
and not the party’s representative. The language does not discuss the
attorney as an individual; instead, it points to the fees of the attorney
134
and directs the funds to the party in the suit.
Aside from the operative language, two other inferences drawn
from the statute further support the idea of the client being the only
permissible recipient. First, the EAJA uses the “prevailing party” language when referring to costs incurred from sources other than an
135
Because an attorney and her
attorney, such as an expert witness.
client are in a representative and fiduciary relationship, a statute
could potentially refer concurrently to both when discussing the
“party.” But when the same statute refers to the “prevailing party” as
the recipient of costs for expert witnesses, the term can only refer to
the plaintiff because the expert witness and the plaintiff have no such

132

See, e.g., Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“[W]e are persuaded by the plain language of the EAJA and conclude that the prevailing party . . . is the proper recipient of attorney fees under the EAJA.”); Stephens
ex. rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hile we may be sympathetic to the concerns raised by Stephens, sympathy does not permit us to ignore the
plain language of the statute.”); Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he statute’s explicit reference to the ‘prevailing party’ unambiguously directs
the award of attorney’s fees to the party who incurred those fees and not to the party’s attorney.”), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246,
1249–50 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008) (“[T]his statutory language clearly provides that the prevailing party, who incurred the attorney’s fees, and
not that party’s attorney, is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees.”); see also Ratliff v.
Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 803 (8th Cir. 2008)(Gruender, J., concurring) (“[O]ur conclusion that EAJA attorney’s fees are awarded to a prevailing party’s attorney also contradicts the plain language of the EAJA.”).
133
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
134
See id.
135
§ 2412(a)(1).
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fiduciary or representative relationship. Second, with most of these
cases arising under the umbrella of Social Security disability appeals,
the actual statute providing for those appeals is instructive. The Social Security Act directs the court to “certify the amount of such fee
for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount
137
of such past-due benefits.” This demonstrates that, notwithstanding
the frequent use of the boilerplate “prevailing party” language, Congress has shown the ability to draft statutes explicitly directing fees
138
straight to the attorney. Given that Congress has demonstrated the
capability of making this distinction, little basis exists for viewing the
term “prevailing party” as reaching the attorney.
Some plaintiffs have argued that the Savings Provision of the
EAJA―which indicates that when an attorney receives fees under
both the EAJA and the Social Security Act, she must refund the
smaller amount―supports the idea that Congress envisioned the at139
While a court may be tempted to
torney as the recipient of both.
read past the Savings Provision and simply take the operative “prevailing party” language at face value, such a reading is problematic because the operative language and the Savings Provision are irreconcilable. The operative language directs the funds to the “prevailing
party” while the Savings Provision indicates that “where the claimant’s attorney receives fees for the same work under [the Social Security Act] and [the EAJA], the claimant’s attorney refunds to the

136
In some other statutes with the same “prevailing party” language, the attorney’s
fees provision is not separated from the miscellaneous-costs provision as it is in the
EAJA. For example, the fee-shifting provision of the Voting Rights Act permits “the
court, in its discretion, [to] allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee,
reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as costs.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973l(e) (2006). In this context, the statute cannot be read to imply that the attorney is the “prevailing party” because the attorney’s fees are not segregated from
other fees as they are in the EAJA, but they are instead lumped in combination with
miscellaneous costs. For the term “party” to encompass the attorney in this situation,
it would need to have two meanings at once. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128
S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2008) (“It would be rather like saying ‘He filled and kicked the
bucket’ to mean ‘He filled the bucket and died.’”). While this could mean that Congress had a separate intent for the two statutes, such intent is not relevant considering the Supreme Court’s statements that all “prevailing party” language in federal
statutes should be treated the same. See sources cited supra note 50.
137
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
138
See id.
139
Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (amending Act of Oct.
21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2321, 2330); see Manning v. Astrue, 510
F.3d 1246, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008).
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claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”
No explanation for this
discrepancy is particularly satisfying. One possibility is that Congress
simply erred in drafting the statute. Another is that because the Social Security Act payments are capped at twenty-five percent of pastdue benefits, Congress drafted the language envisioning that the So141
cial Security payments would always be smaller. But if this were the
case, Congress would have probably ordered the refund of the Social
Security Act fees rather than the smaller of the two. The third possibility is that Congress added the Savings Provision while operating
under the assumption that the fees would continue to be paid to the
attorney directly and that the Savings Provision merely represented
142
the first codification of this practice. Such an explanation is possible but peculiar considering that the Savings Provision is silent on the
direction of the initial fee payments and instead relates only to the
subsequent refund. The House Report on the Savings Provision indicates that Congress may have simply assumed that the EAJA already
143
paid funds directly to the attorney.
But in the context of a feeshifting provision, courts may not need to interpret the term “party”
144
so narrowly.
In this particular context, the argument can be made that the
proper emphasis within the EAJA’s language instead rests with the
term “prevailing.” The purpose of the statute is to ensure that the
losing party pays the costs of the prevailing party. By contrast, in the
aforementioned § 406 language explicitly shifting some past-due
benefits to the attorney, the statute envisions a situation where a
client and attorney have already prevailed and begin assessing fee
145
payments. By that point, the only possible dispute is between client
140

28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2006); § 3, 99 Stat. at 186.
See supra note 89.
142
For a compelling argument in support of the theory that Congress functionally
used the Savings Provision amendment to codify the payment of fees to the attorney,
see Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806–10 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131
(4th Cir. 2009).
143
H.R. REP. NO. 99-120, at 7 (1985), as reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 135–36
(“The bill clarifies that an EAJA award in Social Security cases is not precluded by the
fee provision in the Social Security Act[] . . . . The bill also prohibits attorneys from
collecting both EAJA fees and Sec. 406(b) fees in the same case.”).
144
See Anna L. Chambers, Comment, Equal Access to Justice Act Cuts Off Equal Access
for Social Security Claimants: Reeves v. Barnhart, 12 JONES L. REV. 93, 106–07 (2007)
(arguing that “the use of the phrase ‘prevailing party’ cannot be used as conclusive
evidence that Congress intending [sic] the EAJA check to be payable to the claimant”).
145
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006).
141
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and counsel. Bearing in mind a purpose of genuine fee shifting between adverse parties, the term “party” could potentially distinguish
the two sides of the case rather than the prevailing client and his attorney. Taking the EAJA’s “prevailing” emphasis in conjunction with
the congressional goal of effectuating attorneys’ payments, the term
“party” can reasonably include, without a significant logical leap,
both the attorney and her client together and thus permit a court to
exercise its discretion to direct fees to counsel rather than client. Curiously, no court appears to have embraced or explored this interpretation of the statute’s language, as those favoring payment to the at146
torney have instead relied upon other considerations.
Nevertheless, the statute’s straightforward language might not actually be as straightforward as it first appears.
Aside from the statutory language, many courts will also look to
the EAJA’s legislative history to gain an understanding of precisely
who is intended to be the fee recipient. The legislative history, however, is completely silent on the question. When legislative reports
discuss the “prevailing party,” they deal exclusively with determining
147
the requirements for a party to prevail. The silence in the legislative history demonstrates a broader problem with the “prevailing party” language in fee-shifting statutes: no one seems to have anticipated
disputes arising as a result of a client desiring direct payment to his
attorney while the adverse party demands direct payment to the
148
client. After all, as an abstract matter, whether the direct recipient
is the party or the counsel should make no difference, and from a
drafter’s standpoint, the situation where the client is litigating to
avoid personal acceptance of the government’s fee payments is difficult to imagine.
The reason for this conflict is the Debt Collection Improvement
Act, which takes advantage of the client’s use of the fee-shifting provi146

Some courts adopt an approach of paying the attorney by emphasizing congressional intent as a superceding factor over the plain meaning of the language, but
none has attempted to interpret the plain meaning of the statute as permitting direct
attorney payment without an assignment. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
147
See supra Part II.A.
148
The risk of unintended and unforeseen consequences has been generally recognized in the past and represents one of the most significant problems with the use
of legislative history as an interpretive tool. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983)
(“Most canons of statutory construction go wrong not because they misconceive the
nature of judicial interpretation or of the legislative or political process but because
they impute omniscience to Congress. Omniscience is always an unrealistic assumption, and particularly so when one is dealing with the legislative process.”).
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sion by reshifting the fees back to the government to satisfy the
149
client’s debts. In the relevant portions, the Act provides that after
satisfying certain procedural thresholds, the Department of the Treasury is entitled to offset any government payment issued to the debtor
150
so long as the payment source is not exempted.
Social Security
past-due benefits are not wholly exempt from offset, but they are subject to special rules that exempt the first $9000 of benefits received
151
each year. Therefore, when an indebted claimant succeeds in a suit
to obtain past-due benefits, the government will often find itself unable to deduct funds from the relief and instead must resort to recov152
ery through the fee award.
The legislative history makes clear that the purpose of the EAJA
is to facilitate private litigation against the federal government and
the weight of its resources by providing compensation to prevailing
153
parties. But payment to client or counsel accomplishes this policy
goal because payment to either will result in the alleviation of the
client’s debts. The legislative history therefore provides no real basis
for determining the appropriately payable party. As a result, both
sides of the dispute frequently claim the legislative history in support
154
of their positions.
As a result of the legislative history’s malleability, many courts
that favor directing payment to the attorney instead focus on the pol-

149

See 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006); see also Hines v. Astrue, No. 3:05-CV-02416-KOB,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96985, at *8–9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2007) (“Under the proposed practice, the government can refuse to pay Social Security benefits without
substantial justification yet suffer no true penalty because the EAJA fees that it is required to pay out one day as a penalty can be seized the next.”).
150
§ 3716. The source of the debt is mostly immaterial, so long as a state or the
federal government is the creditor. FIN. MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
2001 FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION & SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENT GUIDE 1 (2001) (on file
with author) (listing student loans, Farm Service Agency and Rural Development
Agency loans, and Food Stamp overpayment as “the most common delinquent federal non-tax debts owed”).
151
§ 3716(c)(3)(C).
152
See supra note 89.
153
See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
154
Compare Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (D. Md. 2008) (“[A] construction of the EAJA that effects windfall payments to individual Social Security
claimants and reduces the availability of counsel for future claimants not only thwarts
Congress’s intent, but also is an irrational and unfair result.”), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131
(4th Cir. 2009), with Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he legislative history for the EAJA also makes it clear that certain prevailing parties, and not their attorneys, may recover attorney’s fees . . . .”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
486 (2008).
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icy incentives underlying the EAJA.
No compelling policy argument genuinely supports paying the client rather than the attorney.
Such a payment scheme runs contrary to even the client’s interest.
When the client has other outstanding debts, the client still benefits
from immediately paying the attorney’s invoice with fees that the
court designates for that purpose. When no debt exists, the attorney
still has a contractual entitlement to the fees and no benefit is gained
when the client must act as an intermediary between the court and
counsel. Any argument in favor of paying preexisting loans before
paying new debts that the plaintiff incurs as a result of the litigation
ignores the fact that the fees awarded are attorney’s fees that the court
granted to the plaintiff in the specific amount owed to counsel and
for the specific purpose of paying counsel. No court would support
an outcome whereby a client uses court-ordered attorney’s fees to pay
credit card debts, mortgages, or utility bills while the attorney still
awaits payment. Yet ironically, the Debt Collection Improvement Act
commands this outcome. Even though fees are labeled as attorney’s
fees, they are effectively used to pay the client’s other debts. Even
many courts deciding in favor of paying the client rather than the attorney acknowledge that the decision is a result of the statutory language and that the more sensible policy decision would be to direct
156
payment to the attorney.
Courts holding for direct payment to the attorney have almost
157
universally relied on policy arguments. These courts often combine
the policy arguments with references to the longstanding practice of
paying the attorney directly or use the Savings Provision to construe
the statute as permitting direct payment to the attorney; however, the
158
policy arguments always remain central. In some instances, courts
candidly admit that they will order payment to the attorney directly,
notwithstanding the contradictory statutory language, because of the

155

See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Manning, 510 F.3d at 1255 (describing as “counter intuitive” the decision “that an award of attorney’s fees does not go to the attorney”); Reeves v. Astrue,
526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008) (“All this, Reeves contends, is bad public policy.
He may well be right, but policy decisions are properly left to Congress, not the
courts.”).
157
See, e.g., Vargas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3586 (KSH), 2008 WL 699581, at
*3–5 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008).
158
See, e.g., King v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 230 F. App’x 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2007);
Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131 (4th
Cir. 2009).
156
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policy issues’ overwhelming weight. For example, one court, in
granting fees to the attorney directly, stated,
The decisions siding with the Commissioner have primarily relied on the principle of statutory construction which holds that
courts should apply the plain meaning of a statute when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. However, these courts,
for the most part, have ignored a less often cited, but equally important, principle of statutory construction which holds that when
the literal application of statutory language would either produce
an outcome demonstrably at odds with the statute’s purpose or
would result in an absurd outcome, courts are entitled to look
beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language.
The literal application of [the EAJA] in this case undeniably
159
leads to bizarre and absurd results.

This statement on statutory interpretation is correct and de160
serves some consideration, but it is not applicable here. While it is
true that courts will “rewrite” statutes when the application of the
strict statutory language blatantly contradicts the purpose of the statute, the ordinary circumstances for such a finding usually involve a
particularly bizarre outcome when the facts are applied to the law lit161
erally. Although the argument for paying only the client is largely
impractical, it is still in harmony with the goals of the EAJA when
considering those goals in conjunction with the goals of the Debt
162
Collection Improvement Act.
Specifically, the outcome of paying
the client is not so one sided when considering that Congress has
159
Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616 (D.N.J. 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Quade v. Barnhart, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171–72
(D. Ariz. 2008) (explaining that payment only to the client would render an “absurd
result” and should not be permitted).
160
See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 850–53 (1992) (defending judicial use of legislative history to help
avoid absurd results and to rectify drafting errors); Louis Fisher, Statutory Construction: Keeping a Respectful Eye on Congress, 53 SMU L. REV. 49, 49–52, 65–67 (2000) (discussing different court approaches to statutory construction).
161
See generally, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991) (permitting
convicted prisoners to recover witness fees even though the statute technically precludes it because they are appearing pursuant to subpoenas); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 590 U.S. 504 (1989) (procedural protections with regard to admissibility
of prior felony convictions for defendants in the Federal Rules of Evidence permitted
to apply to civil plaintiffs).
162
See Chonko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 624 F. Supp. 2d 357, 366 (D.N.J. 2008)
(“The Court acknowledges that allowing the government to use statutory offsets to
reduce its EAJA payments may frustrate EAJA’s purpose. But it is equally true that
such practices serve the purposes of those statutory offsets: to allow the federal government to collect debts owed to it.”).
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permitted offsets as a revenue-raising technique.
Congress may
have balanced the competing factors and simply felt that the policy
goals of the Debt Collection Improvement Act outweighed the policy
goals of the EAJA. Few would likely support this balance, as it defeats
the EAJA entirely in some situations and serves only the purpose of
164
raising relatively meager amounts of revenue through the feeshifting statutes. But it would be incorrect to argue that the offsets
further no policy goal whatsoever, even in this situation, given that
they do serve a legitimate revenue-raising purpose.
In addition to the statutory language, legislative history, and policy considerations, courts often consider Supreme Court precedent
with regard to the payment of attorney’s fees. Courts on both sides of
the dispute have cited existing precedent to support their holdings.
While proponents of paying the attorney point to the longstanding
practice of paying the attorneys and the actions of the Commissioner
in earlier cases, proponents of paying only the client point to court
rulings on the identical “prevailing party” language of civil rights sta165
tutes. But the approach of looking to prior court practice on payment of fees is flawed because it avoids the fact that for a great deal of
time, parties did not litigate the proper recipient issue, which was in166
stead a matter of consent between the parties.
In some past in167
stances, parties litigated the question in the civil-rights context, but
in most cases, the parties consent to who is the appropriate fund re163

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006).
In the fiscal year 2007, all administrative-offset collections accounted for a total
of $179 million. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2007 REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: U.S. GOVERNMENT RECEIVABLES AND DEBT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF
FEDERAL AGENCIES 12 (2008), available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/news/reports/
debt07.pdf.
165
See Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735–36 (11th Cir. 2008); supra notes 84, 138
and accompanying text.
166
Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Technically the
award of attorney’s fees under section 1988 is to the party, not to his lawyer, but it is
common to make the award directly to the lawyer where, as in this case, the lawyer’s
contractual entitlement is uncontested.”). With the issue remaining uncontested for
so long, the Commissioner essentially acquiesced for decades to the idea of paying an
attorney directly under the EAJA and only recently began to take a vociferous position in favor of the literal language. See Vargas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3586
(KSH), 2008 WL 699581, at *8 n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008) (holding for payment directly to attorney and pointing out that “[t]wo of the ‘claimant as prevailing party’
cases . . . are decades old and unpersuasive enough that up until now, the government did not follow them”).
167
See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Of course, since
the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards
must accrue to counsel.”).
164
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cipient and litigate whether payment of those funds is proper in the
first place. Also, the absence of a direct question likely lured some
courts into a degree of complacency with regard to terminology. In
one early case, when a district court granted payment to the plaintiff’s attorney, it wrote that a “clerical mistake” was responsible for
the court’s original decision to direct fees to the plaintiff rather than
168
counsel.
The most relevant and substantive precedents in this area involve interpretation of the phrase “prevailing party” in federal fee169
Although the Supreme Court has never directly
shifting statutes.
addressed the issue of which party is properly payable under any
“prevailing party” statute, it has addressed some issues on the margins
that might favor an approach of treating the client as the proper re170
cipient under the EAJA. In earlier “prevailing party” statutes, however, the opposition was often another private party or a state or local
government who sought no offsets from the attorney’s fee award.
Recovering from the federal government is unique because the Debt
Collection Improvement Act presents a new policy problem that does
not exist in the other cases. Nevertheless, the possibility of offsets
171
should not change the meaning of “prevailing party” in the EAJA.
The reason that offsets have taken place in EAJA cases but not in cases involving other fee-shifting statutes is not because the EAJA’s language is unique, but because the EAJA invariably produces payments
172
The diffrom the federal government rather than private parties.
ferent treatment for attorney’s fees from the federal government is
not a result of internal interpretation of the EAJA; rather, it
168

Dixon-Townsell v. Barnhart, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1284 (N.D. Okla. 2006),
overruled by Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 486 (2008).
169
See supra Part II.B.
170
See id.
171
Note that the major Supreme Court precedents all involve issues of whether a
party can be considered to have prevailed, and if he has, what his rights are when
handling the fees. The term “prevailing party” could potentially have a different
meaning between statutes with regard to payment rights even though it has the same
meaning with regard to “the standards for awarding fees.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912). But such a possibility seems contrary to the traditional
practice of treating identical language in separate statutes alike. But see Sisk, supra
note 17, at 348 (explaining that the EAJA is unique among “prevailing party” feeshifting statutes because it requires that the prevailing party must have “incurred” the
fees).
172
The EAJA only applies when the United States is the losing party. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d) (2006).
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represents a byproduct of a collision with the Debt Collection Im173
provement Act.
As noted in Part II.B, the Supreme Court cases on this question
avoid the issue of the payable party. Most of those precedents involve
a conflict between the client and the attorney rather than a conflict
174
between the client with his attorney against the adverse party. As a
result, they are so easily distinguishable from the current situation
that they provide little help. Although the Supreme Court has generally referred to the client as the recipient of the fees and has sometimes explicitly designated the “plaintiff” or the “claimant” as the fee
target, the Court only did so as dicta and never in an instance when it
was central to the determination of who should be the recipient of
fees when both the client and his counsel want them paid directly to
175
counsel.
These dicta provide guidance on how the Court has
viewed the term in the past but not in a way that significantly aids in
solving the payable-party issue in this situation.
With the law as it stands today, the majority of courts addressing
this question―including the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits ―have put forth the best reading of the statute. The plain meaning of the term “prevailing party”
suggests that the EAJA directs payment to the actual client seeking relief in the case. Further, if not for the Debt Collection Improvement
Act, payments directly to clients would fulfill the goals of the EAJA
just as effectively as would payments to counsel. Supreme Court interpretations of the term “prevailing party,” while not definitive, all
lend themselves more appropriately to an approach that would pay
the party rather than his counsel.
B. Why the EAJA’s Policies Should Prevail
Under current law, unassigned fees paid pursuant to the EAJA
176
should be properly payable to the client and not his attorney. Nev173

Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We also note
that Stephens’s real problem lies with the Debt Collection Improvement Act, not the
EAJA. Prior to the implementation of that statute, our answer to the question posed
in this case would have had no real practical impact.”).
174
See, e.g., Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 84–85 (1990) (involving a dispute between client and his former counsel over payment of § 1988 fees in light of a contingency arrangement); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1986) (involving a question of whether a client can waive § 1988 attorney’s fees as part of a settlement
agreement).
175
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
176
See supra Part IV.A.
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ertheless, the goals of the EAJA are inescapably thwarted when attorney’s fees are automatically offset against preexisting government
debts. The policy goals of the EAJA and the Debt Collection Improvement Act inevitably clash; one statute is a government revenue
177
raiser while the other encourages lawsuits against the government.
When comparing these two policies, however, the goals of the EAJA
are far more important for society. As the House Conference Report
on the EAJA said,
[T]he government with its greater resources and expertise can in
effect coerce compliance with its position. . . .
. . . [The EAJA] rests on the premise that a party who chooses to
litigate an issue against the government is not only representing
his or her own vested interest but is also refining and formulating
178
public policy.

Fees under the EAJA are available for prevailing parties in vir179
tually any civil case against the federal government. These include
not only the aforementioned Social Security disability appeals but also numerous other actions, including erroneous forfeitures, stays of
deportation orders, and appeals of some veterans’ disability bene180
In passing the EAJA, Congress intended to make the courts
fits.
widely available to aggrieved parties and to ease the process of pur177

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990. The Debt Collection Improvement Act contains scant legislative history, but its
goals are transparent. See 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 104-537 (1996)
(Conf. Rep.); Paras N. Shah, Comment, Lockhart v. United States: Decapitating the
New Deal & Ignoring the Plain Language of the Social Security and Debt Collection Improvement Acts, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 455, 460–63 (2006) (explaining the history and operation of the Debt Collection Act as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement
Act).
178
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4988.
179
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (b) (2006) (stating that EAJA fees and costs are
available “to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United
States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action”) (emphasis added).
180
The examples of cases allowing for recovery of fees pursuant to EAJA are too
extensive to list exhaustively. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 405
(2004) (successful appeal of denial of veteran’s disability benefits); Carbonell v. INS,
429 F.3d 894, 895–97 (9th Cir. 2005) (successful appeal of a deportation order);
United States v. 2659 Roundhill Drive, 283 F.3d 1146, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2002) (successful appeal of government property forfeiture); Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Bush,
159 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (successful suit enjoining the Secretary of Commerce to inform the President of “reason to believe” that Italy was engaging in illegal driftnet fishing); see also Sisk, supra note 17, at 230 (“In sum, the
EAJA encompasses nearly every claim or case that is civil, rather than criminal, in nature.”).
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suing judicial remedies.
The benefits of encouraging people to
bring forth these types of cases far outweigh the benefits of the relatively meager revenue-raising accomplishments of offsetting winnings.
Nevertheless, compelling as these policy incentives might be,
they cannot overcome the barriers to direct attorney payment in the
absence of an assignment, most notably the operative statutory language. When Congress drafted the EAJA, it left open the possibility
of the government offsetting plaintiffs’ fees in “prevailing party” actions. The Debt Collection Improvement Act sets forth certain exceptions to administrative offsets. The exceptions are narrow but
create the inescapable conclusion that Congress made a decision to
exempt certain government payments without including fee-shifting
182
statutes among those exemptions. Congress may simply have failed
to investigate the issue adequately before passing the legislation. After all, awards of past-due Social Security benefits are partially ex183
empt, including attorney’s fees awarded from those benefits.
It is
therefore peculiar that Congress would choose to partially exempt
from offsets attorney’s fee payments for Social Security claimants pursuant to one statute but permit offsets under another similar statute.
But the distinction is not necessarily arbitrary; the exempted fees are
removed directly from the prevailing party’s awarded benefits while
the offset-eligible fees are extra governmental payments to a person
who is already indebted to the government. Therefore, the effect of
not offsetting EAJA fees would be for the government to pay the prevailing party’s private debts before collecting on the party’s government debts.

181

The only apparent restriction on the scope of the EAJA is that the action must
be “civil.” Therefore, acquitted defendants in criminal cases and successful appellants of criminal convictions are not eligible for fees under the EAJA. Further, some
circuits have held that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not a “civil action”
in the way that the EAJA intends. O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 501 (4th Cir.
2005) (“Because the EAJA does not expressly authorize an award of attorneys fees to
a prevailing party in a habeas corpus proceeding and because the term ‘civil action’ does
not unambiguously encompass habeas actions, we conclude that the EAJA does not
contain the unequivocal expression of congressional intent necessary to amount to a
waiver of sovereign immunity . . . .”).
182
See 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(2) (2008) (listing exemptions from administrative offsets).
183
31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(C) (2006).
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C. The Limited Availability of a Judicial Remedy
In an ordinary situation, the plain language of the statute will direct to the client payment that will then be eligible for offsets. More
recently, however, courts have shown an increased willingness to
permit payments directly to the attorney when the client signs an assignment of fees to counsel, even in circuits with a default rule for
184
payment to the client. In the Eleventh Circuit in particular, district
courts have directed the fees to the attorney but only when the client
185
has presented an assignment.
There is no clear reason why this
practice has become widespread in the Eleventh Circuit but not else186
where. Courts favoring this approach cite to Reeves v. Astrue, which
directed payment to the client, and distinguish it because it did not
187
involve an assignment.
Courts in other circuits are less accommo188
dating to this compromise.
No appellate court has yet addressed
this practice, but it seems to be a reasonable position that is faithful
to the EAJA’s underlying policies and adheres to its literal statutory
language.
Under this Eleventh Circuit practice, the client’s assignment
serves as his affirmative representation that courts should direct the

184

See Spradlin v. Astrue, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (recognizing the “common practice of other courts in” the Middle District of Florida of permitting an assignment to allow direct payment to attorney); Kersey v. Astrue, No.
2:08cv00045, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43355, at *13 (W.D. Va. May 21, 2009) (permitting assignment to prevail over default rule of payment to client); Coffman v. Astrue,
No. 8:07-CV-1416-T-TGW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101299, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5,
2008) (Commissioner of Social Security declines to oppose an award directly to
counsel when client signs an assignment); Nayab v. Astrue, No. 07cv0733 JM(WMc),
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86927, at *18–19 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (same); FlentroyTennant v. Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-101-J-TEM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49304, at *5–6
(M.D. Fla. June 26, 2008) (permitting an assignment to the attorney as a means to
avoid debt offsets).
185
See, e.g., McCullough v. Astrue, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2008); cf.
Hynes v. Astrue, No. 3:07cv245/LAC/EMT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107064, at *4–5
n.2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2008) (recognizing this approach as a common practice).
186
526 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 2008).
187
E.g., Thompson v. Astrue, No. 3:08-cv-355-J-MCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7198,
at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2009).
188
See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Astrue, No. 2:08-231-DCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005,
at *6 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2009) (providing that assignment to attorney does not overcome EAJA requirement of payment to client); Greer v. Astrue, No. CIV-08-284-D,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46406, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2009) (same); Patton v. Astrue, No. CIV-07-329-SPS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6951, at *4 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 29,
2009) (stating that fees go to client even when attorney has a lien on EAJA awards).
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attorney’s fees to the attorney.
Because such an assignment is already necessary for the direct payment of fees through the portion of
the client’s past-due benefits pursuant to § 406, it seems reasonable
to adopt the same straightforward practice to direct payment of EAJA
fees, even though it is not yet entirely clear whether such an assign190
ment will always serve the purpose of avoiding offsets.
In some
ways, this option is superior to the rule allowing for automatic and
default attorney payment, as it ensures the client a more informed
and flexible role in determining the destination of the fees. Although the result will likely be the same, as most clients would prob191
ably assign the fees to counsel, this process has the benefit of being
consistent with both the language and the goals of the EAJA. In the
192
future, more attorneys should present this argument, and more
courts in other circuits should consider it as an option.
D. The Broader Need for Corrective Legislation
Judicial recognition of assignments is entirely workable, but only
a relatively small number of courts practice it. As a result, Congress
should act to guarantee the effectuation of the EAJA’s goals. On
March 26, 2009, Representative Peter DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat

189

See Dotson v. Astrue, No. 08-0095-CG-M, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6254, at *1–2
n.1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2009) (denying direct payment to attorney because “there is no
supporting documentation, such as a signed fee agreement or an assignment of the
fee, attached”).
190
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUB. NO. 05-10001, REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
DIRECT
PAYMENTS
TO
REPRESENTATIVES
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10001.pdf. Whether the assignment will prevent offsets
may still be an open question, and it appears that at this time, the offsets still occur
even when an assignment is present. 3 NAT’L ORG. OF SOC. SEC. CLAIMANTS’
REPRESENTATIVES, SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 27.03[10] (2009) (“[I]f the
plaintiff has an unpaid federal debt, . . . the amount of the EAJA fee may be reduced
by this debt amount, even if the check is made payable to the attorney.”); see also Woller v. Astrue, No. 08-60733-CIV-COHN, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 14, 2009) (declining to decide whether an assignment, which allowed for direct
payment to attorney, could prevent offsets from ensuing because “the issue [was] not
ripe in the specific context of this award”).
191
Contra Viega v. Astrue, No. 8:07-CV-1001-T-EAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3494, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2009) (claimant requests that she, and not her attorney, be the
direct recipient of fees).
192
This argument is likely to receive more attention in the future because the National Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives now recommends
that all attorneys representing clients potentially subject to offsets obtain assignments
of fees. Press Release, Nat’l Org. of Soc. Sec. Claimants’ Representatives, Supreme
Court to Determine EAJA Payee (Oct. 5, 2009) (on file with author).
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known for taking some “idiosyncratic views,” introduced legislation
194
to address the current issue.
Representative DeFazio’s legislation
would address the issue only with regard to the EAJA as it applies to
Social Security claimants by adding a new section to the EAJA that
would specify payment to the attorney directly and also exempt Social
195
Security payments from Debt Collection Improvement Act offsets.
The enactment of Representative DeFazio’s proposal would be a
good starting point and would address most of the current problems
because the overwhelming majority of these disputes arise through
cases involving Social Security disability appeals. But his legislation
fails to address the full scope of the problem because in different situations it can be either too broad or too narrow.
The proposal is too broad because it rewrites part of the EAJA to
direct attorney’s fee payments directly to attorneys. This new scheme
ensures that the attorney would receive all fees owed to her, but directing fees exclusively to the attorney with no client rights could
pose a significant problem when the client and the attorney disagree
196
on the desired outcome, such as in Evans v. Jeff D. Changing the actual language of the fee-shifting statute would be the ideal solution
when the Social Security claimant and his attorney agree that the attorney should be the recipient, but it would open the door to other
problems when client and counsel disagree and could have the effect
of undermining a client’s autonomy.
Representative DeFazio’s solution is too narrow because it affects
only EAJA payments pursuant to Social Security cases. Therefore, the
same problem could arise in other non-Social Security cases under
197
the EAJA or in cases involving non-EAJA fee-shifting statutes. The
portion of the proposed legislation that would prevent Debt Collection Improvement Act offsets of EAJA payments arising from Social
Security claims, if expanded to encompass all “prevailing party” feeshifting statutes, would be an ideal solution to the problem. Under
the current law, certain government payments are not subject to debt
offsets, but these payments are narrow and do not include attorney’s
193

MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS
2008, at 1368 (2008).
194
H.R. 1735, 111th Cong. (2009). He previously introduced the same legislation
in the 110th Congress (2007–2008), but it never received a committee hearing or any
action. H.R. 5833, 110th Cong. (2008).
195
H.R. 1735.
196
475 U.S. 717 (1986).
197
See infra Part IV.E.
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fees. Congress could easily expand this list to include payments resulting from awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and other federal laws. This solution would not curtail the continued use of the
client as a middleman between the court and the attorney on fee
payments, but it would help limit the risk of unintended consequences of changing the EAJA language itself. Any statutory remedy
should therefore only aim at stopping the offsets.
The goal of ensuring that attorneys are paid in full is an important one, especially with regard to the types of cases that draw EAJA
fees. EAJA fees are capped at the fairly modest amount of $125 per
hour (with cost of living adjustments available) and contain net-worth
199
caps for prevailing parties.
With these types of restrictions, EAJA
fees become disproportionately important in practice areas involving
200
impoverished clients.
If the administration of justice regardless of
client income is accepted as a societal goal, then it is important to
promote every possible incentive for attorneys to enter these fields.
The low price tag on EAJA fees is problematic enough; the threat of
government offsets only further deters attorneys from pursuing these
practice areas.
E. The Potential Application of “Prevailing Party” Language Beyond
the EAJA
As important as EAJA fees may be, they are far from the most
important potential application of the “prevailing party” language.
The dispute over the fee recipient has so far only directly arisen in
the context of EAJA suits, but the language is ubiquitous in federal
201
fee-shifting statutes. Thus, courts could apply their EAJA interpretation to similar “prevailing party” language in other statutes. This
possibility is far from merely speculative. Courts have used interpretations of civil-rights statutes with “prevailing party” fee-shifting lan202
guage as the basis for decisions on EAJA payments, and they may

198

The current exceptions to debt offsets are Black Lung Part C benefit payments,
payments under tariff laws, some Veterans Affairs payments exempted from offset by
statute, payments under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, federal-loan
payments other than travel advances, and any payment where offset is prohibited by
statute or by order of the Treasury Secretary. 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(2) (2008).
199
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (2)(A)(ii) (2006).
200
See supra note 180.
201
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
202
See, e.g., Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S.
Ct. 48 (2009).
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just as readily use interpretations of the same language from EAJA
cases to apply to civil rights cases.
As a result, these EAJA rulings could have far-reaching consequences, potentially affecting civil-rights, environmental, consumerprotection, employment, and government-transparency laws that are
central to our values as a society. If this occurs, just as the current
EAJA laws serve to dissuade attorneys from accepting cases on behalf
of Social Security disability claimants, attorneys may be persuaded to
203
veer away from other public interest cases. The government could
have made this argument when these statutes first took effect, but it
has never done so. But the same can be said for the first twenty-five
years of the EAJA, when relatively few cases involved the issue of the
204
appropriately payable party.
Despite the government’s longstanding assent to attorney’s fees going directly to the attorney in other
types of cases, it is far from settled practice; a shift could occur as ra205
pidly as did the shift in EAJA treatment. In the past, prevailing par-

203
The fee offsets will only apply when the case is against the federal government.
In most civil-rights cases, all parties will be private persons, private firms, or state or
municipal governments. As a result, unlike the EAJA, these statutes provide for feeshifting when both the plaintiff and defendant are private parties. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (2006); id. § 2000A-3(b). Fee offsets will not ensue unless the federal government is the losing party. This severely limits the number of cases where offsets
will become an issue, but when the government itself is liable for a civil-rights violation or another activity subject to a fee-shifting statute, the suit is perhaps more important than when a private party is engaged in ordinary discrimination. See, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions
and Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 176 (1993) (“States should
enact converse-1983 laws because doing so is in the highest tradition of supporting
the federal Constitution and vindicating its implicit remedial scheme, which so heavily depends on each government policing the other to vindicate citizen rights.”); Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 247–58 (2000) (describing the
background of the Equal Protection Clause’s application against the federal government and its significance); see also MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION:
THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1990, at 40–45, 119–32
(1991).
204
See Vargas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3586, 2008 WL 699581, at *8 n.4
(D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008) (pointing out that even though some precedent existed for
the payment of clients directly, the government has only recently sought to actually
enforce it).
205
In many of the cases regarding the proper payable party under EAJA, courts
have acknowledged that the longstanding traditional practice was to direct funds
straight to the attorney. See Quade v. Barnhart, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172–73 (D.
Ariz. 2008); Meyler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 04-4669, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51684, at *11–12 (D.N.J. July 7, 2008); see also Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1255
(10th Cir. 2007) (pointing out that the government changed its position on the ap-

FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2010 4:59 PM

760

[Vol. 40:723

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

ties have occasionally entered into disputes with their adversaries over
whether the client or counsel should receive payment, but these cases
rarely addressed the question directly and never involved instances
where both the client and counsel wanted payment directed to coun206
sel.
The government took a significant leap in the EAJA cases by
pursuing litigation for no apparent purpose other than to offset the
207
fees of prevailing parties.
In suits against the government under non-EAJA “prevailing party” fee-shifting statutes, the government still retains a financial incentive to seek offsets. Unless the government decides to exercise a
greater degree of self-restraint, perhaps for fear that the same
changes in the context of civil rights or government transparency
could garner greater attention or outrage than Social Security disability appeals, the government will likely pursue debt offsets against civil208
rights recoveries in the same way that it has under the EAJA.
In
fact, such an outcome is more probable now than it would have been
if these arguments first appeared in civil-rights cases. Because of this
EAJA issue, five circuits now have controlling precedent to the effect
propriate payable party during the course of litigation), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486
(2008).
206
See, e.g., Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that
fees are payable to plaintiff, not his attorney directly, even though plaintiff was
dropped from some counts in multiparty suit); Willard v. City of Los Angeles, 803
F.2d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing that when plaintiff agreed to waive attorney’s fees as part of a settlement, his attorney had no standing to seek fees on his
own) (citing Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986)); Jonas v. Stack, 758 F.2d 567, 568
(11th Cir. 1985) (determining that attorney who prosecuted fee litigation for attorney of prevailing party lacked standing because he did not personally represent the
prevailing party); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011
(2d Cir. 1983) (asserting that after client discharged his attorney, attorney lacked
standing to apply for own fees); Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539
(5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the court is responsible for ensuring “that the fees allowed are to reimburse and compensate for legal services rendered” and holding
that the Court will consequently not pay “to the litigants”).
207
The government has admitted that its new policy of insisting on payment only
to the client is a result of improved technology that makes it easier to track who has
debts that are subject to offset. Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809–10 (D.
Md. 2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009); Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4. The change in methodology is so
recent that the Social Security Administration’s own handbook still indicates that
when a federal court rules in favor of a plaintiff in a Social Security case, his “attorney
may request reimbursement of the expenses he or she incurred in representing” the
plaintiff. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 2019.7 (2009), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.20/handbook-2019.html.
208
The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to exempt certain types of
payments from offsets under certain circumstances. 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(B)
(2006); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(2)(vi) (2008).
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that attorney’s fees can be offset under the Debt Collection Improvement Act. The Supreme Court will soon hear and decide Astrue
v. Ratliff and potentially set down a national standard on how to interpret this portion of the EAJA. Although the Court will resolve the
circuit split on this specific question, Congress should still consider
additional amendments to clarify the EAJA on these important issues.
V. CONCLUSION
For the first two decades of the EAJA, only occasional disputes
arose over the proper payable party. Only the Federal Circuit and a
smattering of district courts addressed the issue, and it often arose as
a result of disputes between an attorney and her client. That
changed when the Social Security Administration altered its
longstanding practice and began requesting fee payment exclusively
to the client. As a result of that change, the issue now arises frequently in the context of common appeals from administrative decisions to
deny Social Security disability benefits. While the payments previously went to the attorneys directly, essentially by consent as a result of a
prevailing party’s uncontested request, courts have now been forced
to take a position on the question of the proper recipient.
Under the current law, the plain language of the statute unambiguously directs the funds to the client rather than his counsel. Additionally, the broader construction of the statute and the legislative
history, once divorced from the intent and history of the Debt Collection Improvement Act, at least partially support direct payment to the
client. Although the attorney has a contractual right to the funds, the
client incurs the cost of the fees and is entitled to be the immediate
beneficiary of the fee payments. Courts have some flexibility to implement their own solutions to the problem when the client assigns
his fee rights to counsel, but otherwise the language is fairly tight and
inescapable. The law on this matter is, however, palpably flawed from
a policy standpoint. It fulfills the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s
goals of supporting alternate collection techniques for the prevailing
party’s debts, but the practice of paying fees to the client rather than
the attorney does not serve the best interests of the client, the attorney, or society over the long term. Making it more difficult for an attorney to collect her fees in full discourages attorneys from entering
fields heavily reliant on government-paid attorney’s fees and thus defeats the very purpose of the EAJA. Furthermore, the current law
overcomes the congressional goal of allowing each person whom the
government wronged to help with “refining and formulating public
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policy” through the courts. For whatever reason, Congress’s broader scheme regards the revenue-raiser actions as more important than
the goals of the EAJA. Although courts may be tempted to remedy
this inexplicable misplacement of priorities, the statutory language is
sufficiently clear that courts ought not unnecessarily venture to fix
210
the problem in the absence of a fee assignment.
Although assignments enable courts to provide direct payment
to attorneys to mitigate this risk, courts will not accept this approach
universally. For that reason, the best solution is for Congress to remedy this flawed statutory arrangement. This can be accomplished
through the simple addition of attorney’s fees to the list of exemptions from offsets in the Debt Collection Improvement Act. A complete overhaul of all “prevailing party” fee-shifting statutes, with a
goal of clarifying the intent to pay attorneys directly, would solve the
immediate problem but would pose a risk of unintended consequences in the event of a conflict between a client and his attorney.
The current practice of paying EAJA fees to clients has the potential
to create an enormous disincentive for attorneys to enter fields of law
that rely on EAJA fees or to take cases involving clients indebted to
the government. The current practice also presents significant risk
that the common statutory language could create a spillover effect
that will adversely affect the attorneys of other non-EAJA plaintiffs
suing the federal government. Just as the government suddenly
changed its approach to EAJA fees, nothing prevents it from doing
the same with other fee-shifting statutes. The scope and implications
of the change in practice under the EAJA are relatively narrow, but
the flaw in the current drafting could reverberate to cause a chilling
effect on a much broader array of important lawsuits. Without adoption of the assignment alternative or congressional action, the EAJA
might effectively become a self-defeating statute that, in many cases,
fails to accomplish its centerpiece goal of permitting individuals to
pursue cases against the government.

209

H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,

4988.
210
See Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that even if the
EAJA language on attorney’s fees represents “bad public policy,” decisions on policy
“are properly left to Congress, not the courts”).

